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As personalization has dominated the policy agenda for reform in social care, its roll-out as a
mainstream option has coincided with global programmes of austerity which have targeted services
for disabled people. Was this simply bad timing or was its implementation always part of the
agenda for reform? Whilst the principle of cash-for-care schemes drew strongly on promoting the
independence and autonomy of disabled people, early incarnations of direct payments policy in
the UK were initially at least in part rolled out in light of potential cost savings to social care budgets.
This article explores these and other issues in light of evaluations of the Scottish government’s self-directed
support (SDS) test sites (2009–11) and implementation of subsequent legislation enforcing models of
SDS in Scotland from April 2014. Discussion draws on the authors’ recent book (Pearson et al.
2014) to reﬂect on what the evidence can tell us about radically transforming social care at a time
of global austerity.
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Introduction
Over the past 20 years, personalization has emerged as a reforming concept
across many areas of social policy in the UK (see Fox et al. 2013 for criminal
justice; Pykett 2009 for education; Toerien et al. 2013 for employment;
Forder and Jones 2014 for health), gaining what West (2013) identiﬁes as
an ‘ideological grip’ across the public sector. Its appearance in UK systems
of social care draws in part from the legacy of disability activism culminating
in a long fought campaign to secure direct payments as a facilitator of indepen-
dent living (Campbell and Oliver 1996; Morris 1993), alongside a drive to
‘modernize’ and provide more cost-efﬁcient and ﬂexible modes of service provi-
sion in emerging local care markets (Pearson 2000; Spandler 2004). Accord-
ingly, several commentators observe that personalization has come to stand
for a number of competing and contradictory demands: perceived as either aAuthor Emails: Charlotte.Pearson@glasgow.ac.uk; jridley1@uclan.ac.uk
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of service users, or as an attempt to roll back the boundaries of the welfare state,
to introduce neo-liberal ideals, and undermine public sector services and respon-
sibilities (Needham and Glasby 2014).
Elsewhere, European models of personalized social care have emerged with
a similar diversity in policy discourse, varying from the rights-based scheme of
Sweden, to more restrictive approaches – for example in Belgium, France and
Germany – where policy set out speciﬁcally to reduce the numbers of persons
entering residential care (Glasby 2013). Yet across the UK (Slasberg et al.
2015), Europe (see Hauben et al. 2012) and North America (Power 2014),
the impact of austerity on personalized support in social care has been acute.
Despite its roots in the independent living movement (Oliver and Sapey
2006), budget cuts and the broader reconﬁguration of support for disabled
people have acutely undermined these principles. The impact of austerity
not only reﬂects a trend in disability activism, but one that has spread across
services for other user groups. For example, Roy and Buchanan’s (2015)
recent work shows how uncertainty and diminished budgets have greatly
reduced investment in user activism through recovery services. Consequently,
they argue that the parameters for providing services with social value, utility
and effectiveness – the corner stones of independent living – have become far
more limited. In recent years, commentators such as Taylor-Gooby and
Stoker (2011) have positioned the UK programme of austerity reforms as part
of a broader restructuring of state services with a key goal to transfer respon-
sibility from state to the private sector and ultimately to citizens. In these
terms, others have identiﬁed personalization as the neo-liberal tool to facilitate
this process across social care (Ferguson 2007; West 2013), signifying the
end of collective services and community-based support.
Whilst Scotland has traditionally been slow to embrace the market in social
care and was largely sceptical of previous policy incarnations of personalized
support (see Pearson 2004), its implementation of new legislation for self-
directed support (SDS) undoubtedly takes social care into a new era. In this arti-
cle, we explore the promotion of this new era for personalization in Scotland at a
time of austerity. We begin by highlighting the challenges of the personalization
agenda in a broader European context, as many models of personalized support
have also been compromised by acute budgetary cuts. Discussion thenmoves to a
commentary on Scotland’s positioning of SDS in its early stages of implementa-
tion. This provides a more in-depth focus, by drawing on a series of ﬁndings from
the evaluations of SDS test sites in three local authorities across Scotland (Ridley
et al. 2011, 2012; Pearson et al. 2014), information from the roll-out of SDS
across Scotland (Scottish Government 2013) and data from a Freedom of Infor-
mation (FOI) request sent out to all 32 Scottish local authorities in April 2015.
This asked authorities to indicate how many users, across different groups, were
in receipt of each of the four SDS options.We consider whether the early roll-out
of SDS offered a full range of personalization choices in Scotland. In doing this,
we ask whether it is in fact the right plan for reform to facilitate independent
living, but whose legitimacy has been weakened amidst the current spending
restraints. Alternatively, was its role in the dismantling of local networks of
community social care services, loss of community spaces and reducing access© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd2
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welfare reform?Austerity and European Challenges to Personalized Support
Before looking at changes in Scotland, we look brieﬂy at how personalization
policies have fared across Europe in response to the hostile economic climate.
As the European Agency for Fundamental Rights warned in 2012, the long-term
impact of austerity changes clearly has serious implications for the well-being of a
generation of disabled people and would progressively erode the advances that
have been made in establishing and promoting the rights of disabled people
(Hauben et al. 2012). In the Agency’s review of evidence of how austerity mea-
sures have impacted on the rights and status of disabled people, austerity has
undoubtedly emerged as a negative inﬂuence, with signiﬁcant differences over
its impact on individual disabled people’s lives observed across Europe. For exam-
ple, countries such as Germany, Austria and Scandinavia appeared to have
endorsed far fewer reductions in social beneﬁts and social services, particularly
in contrast to Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Like the UK, Hungary has
tended to frame austerity measures through a broader programme of welfare
reform and discourse of modernization. Yet overall, the pattern indicates a clear
focus on the reduction of social services, thereby disproportionately impacting on
disabled people (Pearson et al. 2014).
As we detail later in this article, access to a personalized budget (PB) has
become increasingly restricted as the austerity cuts have taken hold. This is
a trend that is also being replicated across Europe. Even in member states
with well-established independent living schemes, key changes have been
made which limit disabled people’s access to personal assistance (PA). One
of the tools used to restrict access has been through use of waiting lists. In Ireland,
for example, waiting lists for social and health care have sharply increased and
more than 25 per cent of persons with physical impairments are waiting for
access to assessments for PA and support services (Hauben et al.2012). Similarly
amongst Belgium’s Flemish community, the PA waiting list has increased to
50,000 people – resulting in an estimated ﬁve to ten year wait for this type of
support (Ratzka 2012). In other countries such as Greece, where there are no
PB schemes in place, ﬁnancial support to enable disabled people to live more
independently has simply been cancelled. Likewise in Portugal, plans to intro-
duce PBs from 2011 have been delayed indeﬁnitely (Hauben et al. 2012).Austerity, Personalization and a New Era for Social Care in
Scotland
Like many of the examples shown across Europe, for local authorities across the
UK, rolling out of personalization and SDS in social care has also coincided with
the economic crisis. In Scotland, the Social Care (Self Directed Support) Act
2013 was implemented from April 2014, just as many of the austerity measures
were beginning to take force. Leading up to this period, overall Scottish spending
was reduced by around11 per cent in real terms across a four-year period, leaving
a 7 per cent cut in resources across local authority spending and 37 per cent in© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 3
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within local authorities, cost cutting of local budgets has acute implications for its
users. Whilst this had already had a signiﬁcant impact on the planning and
delivery of services (Main 2013 ), it was clear that changes were ongoing.
Indeed, analysis by the Scottish Government indicated that the worst of
the cuts were yet to emerge – with the full impact of changes expected in
2016 (Scottish Government 2014b). Furthermore, the election of a majority
Conservative Government in May 2015 with a commitment to cut welfare
spending by a further £12 billion signiﬁed a longer-term decline for funding in
these service areas (Watt 2015). As we show in this article, frontline social care
workers in Scotland have continually expressed strong concerns about the current
and future impact of austerity measures in adopting SDS. In order to examine
these issues in more detail, we draw on ﬁndings from evaluative studies of SDS
as the basis of a critical commentary on the positioning of policy in the early
stages on implementation. The following section details the background and
methodology to this work.Background to the Test Sites and Methodology
In 2009, as government cuts on social welfare spending were starting to
impact, the Scottish Government, Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
and the Association of Directors of Social Work (ADSW) selected three local
authorities to design and test out the systems needed to implement SDS in
social care. The test sites were selected to represent a broad geographical
spread including one remote rural site, and local authority performance based
on Social Work Inspection Agency inspections. Each test site was given up to
£1.2 million for just over two years (January 2009 to 31 March 2011 ) to
put in place systems that would facilitate a shift towards SDS. At the outset,
the Scottish Government wanted the test sites to focus on three themes iden-
tiﬁed from research evidence as critical to enable this transformation: these
were the need to reduce bureaucracy or ‘red tape’; the importance of leader-
ship and training; and the need for bridging ﬁnance to double fund existing
services whilst introducing more individualized models of support.
The evaluative studies that we draw upon for this article used a mixed
methods approach involving several elements. The ﬁrst evaluation comprised
a review of the literature on facilitators and barriers to SDS (Manthorpe et al.
2011); gathered and collated quantitative information about those receiving
SDS packages; conducted secondary analysis of national statistical data (Scottish
Government 2011); carried out interviews with national and local stakeholders;
held action learning sets involving key stakeholders from each area; monitored
test sites’ implementation plans; and focused on 30 individual service users’
and carers’ experiences to better understand these new SDS systems from
service users’, family carers’, and frontline workers’ perspectives.
A follow-up evaluative study involved interviews with key stakeholders, a
questionnaire survey of frontline staff and gathered systematic monitoring
information to provide an update on developments in terms of the processes,
practice, outputs and outcomes of SDS in the former test site areas (Ridley
et al. 2012). The views of over 60 different stakeholders from the three areas© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd4
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voluntary sector providers. Over 500 frontline staff in adult social care across
the three areas were surveyed via an online questionnaire (with a response
rate of 43 per cent). This article draws in particular upon the ﬁndings from
this survey to reﬂect upon frontline workers’ experience and perceptions of
the impact of budget cuts on SDS implementation.
In order to provide an updated snapshot of SDS implementation in Scotland,
we also carried out a FOI request across the 32 local authorities in April 2015.
Authorities were asked the question: What are the total numbers of users
currently receiving SDS for each of the four options? At the time of writing,
29 local authorities had replied. Twenty-six of these offered full information
on the questions asked, three only included partial data and two local authorities
declined the request on grounds of cost. The implications of these ﬁndings are
discussed later in this article.
Ethical and research governance approvals were received for the research
from the University of Central Lancashire PsySoc Ethics Committee as well
as from the ADSW and the three local authorities.
In this article, we consider ﬁndings across these studies alongside an FOI
request to explore how the timing of the austerity cuts has impacted on the
implementation of SDS. This is discussed through four key issues. First, by
looking at the shift away from direct payments to SDS, we consider how grass-
roots disability activism and its considerable inﬂuence in the development of
direct payments became diluted under the inﬁltration of neo-liberalism and
the personalization of social care. Second, discussion moves to examine these
ideas more speciﬁcally in the Scottish context by looking at how personaliza-
tion has been adopted through new legislation and what we deﬁne as an
‘evolving concept of SDS’. Third, we return to issues relating to the discourse
of cost-efﬁciency associated ﬁrst with direct payments and then with the
broader personalization agenda. This has clearly been a signiﬁcant theme in
the adoption of personalization policies across the UK – particularly when
comparing to other countries such as Norway. Indeed, we show how ﬁndings
from the test sites offer some evidence to support this contention, whereby in
some areas, SDS has been used as a mechanism to cut support packages. This
links into the ﬁnal area, a focus on the limitations and problems of the
resource allocation system (RAS).From Direct Payments to Self-directed Support
As has been documented extensively elsewhere (e.g. Campbell and Oliver
1996; Glasby and Littlechild 2009) the idea of cash-for-care as an alternative
to directly provided services originated in the 1970s in the USA (Arksey and
Kemp 2008). This saw a small group of students with physical impairments
at the University of Berkeley secure payment of cash in place of services to
buy-in support which ﬁtted their daily needs. Gradually, news of this spread
throughout the USA and by the 1980s, similar challenges were being made
by groups of disabled people in the UK. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
indirect payments – those administered through third parties such as voluntary
organizations – were used to overcome legal restrictions to a cash-based model© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 5
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roles of small groups of disabled people were central to changes during this time.
They demanded a more ﬂexible alternative to rigid and paternalistic modes of
service provision offered to them by local authorities. In Scotland, although
developments were more limited, pockets of activism also emerged during the
1980s, notably in the former Lothian region. At this time, Lothian Regional
Council permitted three indirect payments to be made. While this was initially
approved, problems arose when, in 1995 , the then Department of Social
Security was alerted to this practice and suspended all the payments of those
involved. A challenge to the case in Lothian was made and won by the local
authority, but the case had raised the proﬁle and potential of cash payments
to increase disabled people’s choice and control over their social care, thereby
instigating the need for a formal legislative path to be developed (Pearson
2004). Disability activism therefore undoubtedly played an important role in
moving towards legislation for direct payments in the late 1990s, although as
we discuss shortly, a discourse of cost-efﬁciency always prevailed.
Whilst many welcomed the shift to direct payments, change was not uniformly
embraced with strong resistance emerging in many parts of the UK. In particular,
the number of users in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland were especially low
(Riddell et al. 2005) when compared with key local authorities in the south of
England such as Hampshire and Essex. From 1997 to 2003, various attempts
were made by the then Scottish Executive and Westminster Governments to
reignite policy, but uptake was never more than marginal (Priestley et al. 2010).
Under the Labour Government (1997–2010 ) many of the themes which
linked direct payments to the Conservatives’ broader agenda of marketization
were developed through a focus on the personalization of social care services
(Pearson 2004 ). At this stage, ideas promoted by Leadbeater (2004 ;
Leadbeater et al. 2008 ) exploring how services could be modernized through
the direct participation of users in service delivery, had a profound inﬂuence
on reforming the adult social care system. Leadbeater et al. (2008: 47 ) argued
strongly in favour of a model of consumerism which encouraged users to take
on the role of a budget holder, but at the same time embracing themes of
citizenship and related notions of rights and entitlements. Although widely
popular amongst Westminster Government circles from the mid-2000s,
caution was expressed from a number of quarters.
For many, the promotion of consumerist identities sat uncomfortably with
the experiences and identities of many people who use social care and mental
health services (Carr 2011; Morris 2004). Others such as Ferguson (2012 )
and Dodd (2013 ) argue that the social justice values associated with personal-
ization policies and which were so strongly promoted by the disability move-
ment, have been subsumed by neo-liberalism. Therefore rather than extend
individual autonomy, Ferguson warned that such policies would be used by
cash-strapped local authorities to make savings from their services. As we
discuss shortly, it is clear that this neo-liberal discourse has remained domi-
nant in the roll-out of personalization and is an unhelpful legacy for its imple-
mentation (Pearson et al. 2014).
In Scotland, the shift to a more personalized system of social care has been
slower and more complex (Kettle et al. 2011). As stated, this undoubtedly© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd6
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than south of the border and a reluctance in many areas to fully embrace
direct payments (Pearson 2004 ). As policy emerged, the Scottish Govern-
ment employed the term Self Directed Support (SDS) to develop distinctive
policy goals (Manthorpe et al. 2014), setting out SDS to be part of its aspi-
rations to create a ‘healthier nation with stronger and safer communities’
(Scottish Government 2007: 2).
It is clear from the history of direct payments, personalization, individual
budgets (IBs), SDS and other cash-for-care based schemes in social care that
terms can be used interchangeably and are confusing (Manthorpe et al.
2014 ). Notably, direct payments and personal budgets have often been set
out as being essentially the same thing – in that they both involve a cash
alternative to directly provided services. However, as Beresford (2009) notes,
there are important differences in their underpinning ideologies. As discussed
earlier, direct payments were a grassroots development emerging from the
disabled people’s movement and a desire to equalize opportunities and
increase independent living (see Glasby and Littlechild 2009), whilst personal
budgets evolved from developments largely driven by professionals critical of
the welfare state and its ability to promote independent living. Direct
payments are based on a social model of disability and the philosophy of inde-
pendent living, whereas ‘personalization’ emerged from the vision of welfare
reformers such as In Control – pioneers of SDS and IBs in 2003 – as an
approach to enable disabled people to direct and take charge of their support
and which has since underpinned UK-wide policies promoting personaliza-
tion (Pearson et al. 2014 ). The following section explores this in relation to
the development of SDS in Scotland.Self-directed Support – An Evolving Concept
The Social Care (Self-directed Support) (Scotland) Act 2013 (the SDS Act)
offered four different options for SDS. These included option 1, a direct
payment approach; option 2, a selection of support by the user but arranged
through the local authority or other agency on their behalf; option 3, support
organized and provided by the local authority; or option 4 , a mixture of these
options (Scottish Government 2014a). Critically, support for SDS from the
governing Scottish National Party brought policy into the mainstream of
social care provision and thereby increased the numbers of people directing
their own support from the time of implementation in April 2014. Unlike
previous policy incarnations, the focus on direct payments as only one variant
of the SDS approach has caused some confusion with SDS becoming an
‘evolving’ or ‘elastic’ concept, which has been variously deﬁned and imple-
mented much as has personalization (Ridley et al. 2011; Manthorpe et al.
2011; Larsen et al. 2013 ). As discussion moves to look at some of the broader
policy discourses, we re-visit this theme later in the article.
Commentators identify a perceptible shift in the rhetoric around personal-
ization, moving from a primary focus on individual control over budgets, to
an emphasis on the importance of offering ‘choice and control’ and focusing
on individual outcomes (Beresford 2009 ). The experience of the test sites© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 7
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stated purpose of the test sites had been to increase the number and range of
people receiving direct payments, ‘The very baseline is Manifesto commitments, each
of the test sites must demonstrate increase in take-up of direct payments as an absolute …’
(Interview with national policymakers in 2010, quoted in Pearson et al.
2014: 31–2).
In contrast, local and national stakeholders insisted that SDS was a broader
concept implementing ‘personalized services’, and that it consisted of a spectrum
of options that included direct payments at one end and local authority-provided
services at the other. This broader deﬁnition of SDS was also in evidence in the
National Strategy for SDS (Scottish Government 2010), as well as in the subsequent
SDS Act. Furthermore, the range of support packages evidenced during, and a
year after the test sites, reﬂected this. Initially at least, direct payments (option
1) was the most common SDS option (Ridley et al. 2011), while at the follow
up evaluation, the majority of SDS packages were arranged and managed by
local authorities (option 3) (Ridley et al. 2012): a pattern mirroring the experi-
ence of PBs in England, the majority of which were taken in the form of local
authority managed budgets (ADASS 2011; Beresford 2013; Slasberg et al.
2013). Indeed, by the time of our FOI request in April 2015, 73 per cent of
the local authorities that responded (n=26) indicated that option 3 – support
organized and provided by the local authority – was the most commonly used
form of SDS. In only one local authority did direct payment recipients (option
1) outnumber those in option 3.A Discourse of Cost-efﬁciency
Since legislation implementing direct payments in the late 1990s, and the
promotion of personalization by Leadbeater et al. (2008 ), a discourse of
cost-efﬁciency has been a major feature of policy promotion across the UK.
Even before this time, the successive dismissals of direct payment legislation
on the statute throughout the 1990s were only brought to an end when the
British Council of Disabled People commissioned research, which in promot-
ing the merits of direct payments also showed them to be up to 40 per cent
cheaper than directly provided services (Zarb and Nadash 1994). Whilst this
has never been realized in practice, the link between personalization and cost-
efﬁciency has remained a dominant theme in the UK. Leadbeater et al.
(2008) and others (see Duffy 2010; Needham 2011a,2011b) have highlighted
the link, suggesting that savings could even be as high as 45 per cent. This
despite the national Individual Budget (IBSEN) study (Glendinning et al.
2008) ﬁnding an11 per cent increase in infrastructure costs, thus contradicting
the claim that the process could increase value for money.
It is therefore clear that the focus on budgets and empowerment through cash-
for-care has been a key feature of personalization in the UK. This is reiterated by
Christensen and Pilling (2014), who examined the differences between personal-
ization policies implemented in social democratic welfare regimes and those in
more neo-liberal contexts. In looking at this issue, they provide a comparative
analysis of Norway and England and argued that whilst both ran systems that
had been supported by active disability movements and promoted market based© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd8
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care markets and the focus on consumer roles. In England a key policy emphasis
has been to give users knowledge of the amount they have to spend (indicative
budget) on their support upfront and to have choice and control on how this is
spent (Glasby and Duffy 2007).
Thus the speed at which IBs have been implemented in the UK was, as
Carr (2013 ) has observed, made on the basis of scant evidence. In Scotland,
the results of a small-scale IB demonstration project in North Lanarkshire
were positive about the beneﬁts and the potential of the In Control approach
(Etherington et al. 2009), and this was followed by test sites adopting a similar
approach in 2009 (Ridley et al. 2011). The nexus of control promoted at the
heart of the personalization strategy in England has often been presented as
entirely positive and that if people have choice and control simply by virtue
of knowing the allocated budget, its actual size is unimportant. As Slasberg
et al. (2012, 2013, 2015) observe, however, this fails to acknowledge that
positive results were associated with PBs being taken as direct payments,
and further that those receiving local authority managed services did not
experience the same positive outcomes. Furthermore, better individual
outcomes have been found for those using a direct payment to employ PAs
and have enough resource to meet social and leisure needs (Slasberg et al.
2015). By contrast, Norway’s focus has been on the control (or what
Christensen and Pilling [2014] term ‘citizen choices’) they have over the
actual support received, that is, the role of managing their support workers.
The experience of the test sites offers a different insight regarding upfront
allocations. While not disputing that a resource allocation in the form of an
IB should be transparent, the Dumfries & Galloway test site concluded that
such transparency sometimes resulted in inferior solutions as it shifted the
focus to the budget entitlement instead of on the outcomes sought. Instead,
it concluded that prior to introducing a budget ﬁgure, identifying and working
with natural support networks led to the development of more creative solutions
based on individuals’ assets and community resources:
‘The In Control 7-steps didn’t work for us. It was the money upfront bit. What we learnt
from the test site was that if you tell people what the money is you get a plan that is that to
the penny. We did a few where we didn’t say what the indicative budget was and quite a
few came in at less and they were more outcomes focused. Giving the ﬁgure upfront we
found was skewing people’s thinking, and the plans were not quite as creative’ (Local
authority implementation staff, quoted in Pearson et al. 2014: 35)
As other research has shown (Hatton andWaters 2013), user and carer satisfac-
tion with SDS has been linked with agreement about the panel’s decision on the
size of the IB in relation to what they identiﬁed was needed (Ridley et al.2011).
User and carer dissatisfaction in the test sites was commonly associated with
there being some discrepancy between what they perceived as their needs and
the ﬁnal ﬁnancial allocation decided by the local authority, as well as with differ-
ences between users, carers and professionals in their perceptions of need. Some
users felt they had been encouraged to have ‘false expectations’ as one disabled
man in his 70s demonstrates:© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 9
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10‘They (social workers) took everything into consideration that we were telling them and
they wrote it down and then they checked it against what we had written down, the
form we had ﬁlled in, and they seemed quite in agreement with what we needed and
what we had self-assessed and then as I say it went away and sat in front of this
Board (panel) for a year and when we got word back, everything had been cut, we only
needed so many hours and … in the morning and so many hours at night for getting
ready for bed and whatever …’ (quoted in Ridley et al. 2011: 57)Frontline workers from the Glasgow test site in particular linked SDS with
making cuts in social care budgets, identifying negative impacts on service
users’ choice and control. Personalization they said, was a ‘means to cut
services’, a ‘guise to reduce budgets’, and the process was overtly ‘budget
orientated’ rather than driven by an ethos of independent living. The direct
impact of cuts on social care and the inability then to implement SDS in
the way intended, was a common theme, even though many typically pref-
aced their comments with ‘personalization is a good idea but …’. Some
highlighted increased stress for service users and carers with many experienc-
ing a reduction in traditional packages of care when they were moved onto
SDS, which impacted negatively on their quality of life. The majority of front-
line respondents made this clear link:
‘The SDS process is being used as a mechanism for managing budgets. However this is in
relation to the overall ﬁnancial climate and the cuts would have been required regardless of
the implementation of SDS… Support packages tend to only deal with basic need and no
longer take into consideration quality of life and in some cases the panel does not account
for carers’ stress within the support package.’ (frontline worker responding to the
online survey 2012)It is likely that such dissatisfaction with SDS budgets will continue to increase in
the future, given the ﬁnancial constraints that local authorities will increasingly
face (see Scottish Government 2014b).Limitations of Resource Allocation Systems
One of the most controversial elements of the personalization programme in
social care has been the system for allocating resources or RAS (Slasberg et al.
2012; Series 2014). The RAS is deﬁned as ‘a set of rules that can be used to
calculate an individual budget’ (Duffy 2010 : 206). It has therefore been
central in how local authorities make decisions about individual packages.
Yet growing evidence suggests that RAS are operating in ways that were
not anticipated by those who promoted them (Series 2014 ). Indicating the
strength of feeling evoked by RAS, a user-led organization consulted during
the test sites evaluation observed, ‘we [disabled people’s movement] fought for SDS
and personalisation but not for the RAS’ (Pearson et al. 2014 : 36 ). All three test
sites struggled with setting up RAS under the In Control model, and had
not resolved these issues one year on. A major limitation to RAS was found
in applying it across client groups:© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Slotting people into boxes is not going to work. At the end of the test site and now there
is still a need to develop an equitable way of distributing and managing resources. We
know what we have is not quite right but we haven’t solved this issue yet.’ (local
authority implementation staff, Pearson et al. 2014: 59)
Dissatisfaction with RAS has tended to centre around increased bureaucracy
and questions have been raised as to what constitutes a ‘fair allocation’
(Slasberg et al. 2013 ). As West (2013 ) found in her study of personalization
in an English authority, amid austerity cuts of around 30 per cent, resource
restrictions meant that for many, the very possibility of obtaining a PB was
denied. Yet rather than address these issues directly, the Council moved
forward with the scheme and presented it as part of a ‘transformation strategy’
which would help widen the social care market and drive out perceived inef-
ﬁciencies in service provision. West’s work highlighted how populations of
social care users have been left outside new systems of personalized support
by reframing the boundaries of eligibility. In Scotland, similar patterns are
beginning to emerge. For example in Glasgow, the initial development of
SDS coincided with an11 per cent cut from the £89 million social care budget
during 2012/13 (Main 2013). In explaining the cuts, the local authority has pre-
sented personalization as a strategy for services to be delivered more efﬁciently. It
will be interesting whether deﬁning eligibility determination using national eligi-
bility criteria as under the Care Act 2014 in England, will alter this picture south
of the border (Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2014).
Research ﬁnds amajor discrepancy overall between indicative and ﬁnal budget
ﬁgures agreed by RAS panels (Series and Clements 2013; Slasberg et al. 2013).
This was borne out to some degree by the experience of the Scottish test sites,
though our data is derived from small participant numbers and is not strictly
comparative with these other studies. Nonetheless, our data indicates the emer-
gence of similar concerns in Scotland, with only a minority of frontline workers
suggesting that outcomes from SDS were more positive:
‘We are clearly advised to work towards less rather than more and we know before we
discuss cases that the budget needs to come in less than the estimated budget and deﬁnitely
less than existing service provision unless there is compelling reasons to argue differently…’
(frontline worker responding to online survey, 2012)
One year on from the test sites, frontline workers from Glasgow commented
that ﬁnal budget levels were invariably lower than those proposed, and that
service users were experiencing cuts in support. Around three out of ﬁve
agreed that SDS budgets were insufﬁcient to meet needs, which was similar
to the ﬁndings of the UK-wide Community Care and Unison PB Survey
(in 2011 ), showing 48 per cent of social work practitioners assessing PBs as
insufﬁcient to meet service users’ needs (Community Care and Unison
2011). Whilst the strength of feeling linking SDS with cuts was less pro-
nounced in two of the test sites, frontline workers in Highland expressed
disquiet that budget constraints made it difﬁcult to get funding approval for
more ‘aspirational’ rather than ‘critical’ needs, indicating a shift in the© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 11
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zation was initially promoted as ‘aspirational’ (Needham 2011b).Discussion and Conclusions
As Scotland has moved to implement SDS as the mainstream framework for
social care, this article has raised a number of concerns relating to the timing
and underpinning discourses inﬂuencing this shift. Findings from SDS test sites
in Scotland and more recent ﬁgures on SDS take-up from local authorities indi-
cate that SDS has moved away from direct payments to a focus on support which
is organized andmanaged by the local authority. At best, those who have entered
the SDS system in Scotland may have experienced greater involvement in the
discussion about their needs and support packages. However, as test site results
show, there is also evidence that reassessment through a new SDS process falls
short of co-production and may, at worst, amount to reduced support packages.
Those implementing SDS continue to face a number of thorny issues not least
with systems of allocating resources which tend to become heavily bureaucratized
and act as mechanisms for delivering cuts (Beresford 2013). As Stack (2013)
observes, the reality of RAS is ‘more opaque’ than intended. The root of the
problem may however lie more fundamentally as Slasberg et al. (2013) argue in
what is meant by ‘fair allocation’.
Furthermore, as Hall (2011) argues, the new ‘care market place’ for
personalization has both transformed existing relations of care and constrained
collective and interdependent forms of care that many people value, resulting in
a ‘lack of ﬁt’ between the needs of different groups of disabled people and person-
alized care provision. As local authorities devolve their budgets to the individual,
collective forms of support will inevitably receive less resourcing (Needham2013).
The implications of more privatized experiences of social care support and
reduced opportunity for social interaction linking with broader critiques of
neo-liberalism across the social sciences (Dodd 2013; Verhaeghe 2014). As
Monbiot (2014) suggests, ‘the market was meant to emancipate us, offering
autonomy and freedom. Instead it has delivered atomization and loneliness’.
Whilst the cuts from local authority budgets have undoubtedly impacted on
the roll-out of SDS, the establishment of the Scottish Independent Living
Fund (SILF) in July 2015 – with a £5 .5 million investment from the Scottish
Government to continue with existing payments – represents an important
departure from policy in England and Wales (Northern Ireland is also
covered by the SILF). Since its inception in the mid-1990s, the Independent
Living Fund (ILF) allowed an alternative route to cash payments for disabled
people with the highest support needs, as funds were paid via a charity and
funded through central government rather than local authorities. It proved
highly popular with its users and played an important role in the evolution
of personalized support (Morris 2004). However, the UK coalition Government
(2010–15) set in place a decision to close the ILF in July 2015 and transfer mon-
ies to local authorities in England andWales without a requirement for them to be
ring-fenced – a move that has been widely criticized, and raised questions about
how already cash-strapped authorities would cover the fund’s costs and enable
its users to sustain the same levels of independence (White 2013). The contrast© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd12
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therefore important when looking at the broader personalization agenda, as each
has very different implications for the goals of autonomy, citizenship and control.
Despite growing critiques of personalization, Beresford (2014 ) argues that
innovative grassroots developments have much to offer. Notably, initiatives
such as those led by The Standards We Expect consortium (Joseph Rowntree
Foundation 2011 ) have set out a vision for person-centred support and devel-
oping ‘bottom–up’ ways of challenging barriers to this. Although highlighting
the difﬁculties in achieving personalized outcomes in a hostile economic
climate, these commentators also argue that the funding shortfall is intrinsi-
cally linked to the continued existence of a social care culture that remains
at odds with person-centred support and the principle of self-determination.
The solution, argue Slasberg and Beresford (2015), lies in learning the ‘right
lessons’ from the implementation of personalization so far, moving from
consumerist notions of individual control and a preoccupation with PBs, to
refocusing on truly personalized support plans built from accurate assessment
of needs, sufﬁciency of resource and ﬂexibility of provision.
In Scotland, examples of positive practice in SDS are emerging. Research
funded by Glasgow Disability Alliance (Witcher 2014) was set up by a user-
led organization to explore options for disabled people to enable increased
choice and control in their day-to-day lives. The project focused on the core
requirements of facilitating individual choice and independent living, and
found there was no obvious or consistent relationship between the amount
of money that was spent on realizing individual choices and the scale of its
impact. For example, some packages involved considerable investment for a
British Sign Language interpreter to be available, whereas others required
only a few hundred pounds for transport costs so that the individual could
attend classes of his or her choice. Similarly, the test sites found no correlation
between the size of the support package and the impact of SDS on individ-
uals’ and families’ lives (Ridley et al. 2011). As Witcher (2014 ), along with
Slasberg and Beresford (2015) argue, the success of SDS is in support that
is truly person-centred and is clearly linked to self-deﬁned outcomes. As such,
the message of increased and more meaningful user-control from this type of
initiative, underlines how control – or in the Norwegian concept of ‘citizen
choices’ (Christensen and Pilling 2014 ) should be a more central preoccupa-
tion in the implementation of SDS.
This links in with broader critiques by Beresford (2014), who argues that in
England, commissioning authorities must ensure that the price paid in the
‘care market’ for services is enough to provide a personalized approach. In
doing this, he emphasized the need for local areas to develop a network of
providers who are able to deliver ﬂexible and responsive services and not
simply block contracts. Although the marketization of social care is arguably
at a more advanced stage in England, Scotland still has lessons to learn and
securing a key role for user-led organizations would be an important way
forward. In Norway, users are increasingly choosing a user-led organization
‘Uloba’ as their service provider for PA. As Christensen and Pilling (2014)
show, these users are found to be signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with this model
of support than those who have chosen the municipality as the employer.© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd 13
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of caution in light of the wider challenges to sustaining activism as part of service
provision and policy development amid long-term cuts to budgets. For Roy and
Buchanan (2015), the climate of insecurity and uncertainty emanating from aus-
terity has the potential to erode solidarity and trust, with the threat of unemploy-
ment making opportunities for service commissioners and providers to develop
activism particularly difﬁcult. Evidence from the initiatives documented by
Beresford and Witcher above, as well as Roy and Buchanan’s own observations
in recovery services, show that this more negative outcome is not inevitable, but
the austerity environment is undoubtedly more hostile to this vital support
infrastructure.
In conclusion, at one level SDS is an uncomplicated idea that is impossible to
disagree with, but as the experience of implementing SDS policy in Scotland has
shown, there are ongoing challenges that need to be faced. To implement SDS
in any meaningful way requires a major paradigm shift in the relationship
between users and professionals, and a refocus on the importance of the ethos
of independent living. Further, the will to promote user-centred practice and
to embrace transformational change cannot be progressed in isolation from
the austerity drive that is evident across Europe.Acknowledgements
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